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A B S T R A C T
The use of body-worn cameras by police forces around the world is spreading quickly. The
resulting mobile and ubiquitous surveillance is often marketed as an instrument for ac-
countability and an effective way of reducing violence, discrimination or corruption. It also
involves remarkable potential for intrusion into the privacy of both individuals and police
agents. We analyse the deployment of police body-worn cameras in five countries, inves-
tigate their suitability as an accountability tool given the associated privacy threats, and
discuss the societal impact of their deployment as well as the risk of function creep.
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1. Introduction: motivations for the use of
police body cameras
During the summer of 2014, Ferguson (Missouri) was the scene
of tragic events. An 18-year-old African American was shot by
a police officer, during a routine control, in the middle of the
day and outside the reach of video cameras.The police argued
that the (six) shots were fired by the police officer in legiti-
mate self-defence as the young man was attacking him.
Witnesses related that, on the contrary, the adolescent was
standing at a reasonable distance from the police officer, thereby
not posing a threat. In such complex and sensitive cases, it is
left up to the courts to assess the veracity of the different tes-
timonies, cross-checking other sources of evidence (such as
forensic expertise) whenever available.This process is however
dependent of highly subjective elements, often giving way to
a feeling of injustice among the public, especially minorities,
or police officers wrongly accused of misbehaviour. In the Fer-
guson case, the decision by the Grand Jury not to indict the
police officer after reviewing all the evidence sparked another
wave of riots fuelled by protesters’ outrage.1 By contrast, in
Mexico, recurrent intent to bribe police officers was evi-
denced when a womanwas filmed threatening the police officer
who had arrested her for exceeding the speed limit.2
The police are also increasingly faced with recording made
by citizens with their smartphones. Some of these videos chal-
lenge the accounts provided by police officers, undermining
their credibility. As a way of example, in the UK, a few years
ago, by-passers recorded the scene when the police shot a pre-
sumed criminal, Mark Duggan, during a pre-planned operation.
The images showed that at the time of the shooting, Mark
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Duggan was unarmed. The family then accused the police of
“executing” him and this sparked violent riots.3
In this context, body-worn cameras are increasingly put
forward as a solution to control the use of force by the police.
In some countries with corruption problems, they are also seen
as a way to limit abuse and to restore the credibility of police
officers.4 Body-worn cameras are wearable video cameras that
police officers can wear alongside their badges, clipped to their
uniforms or worn as a headset. They fulfil three main inter-
related goals. First, they are anticipated to increase the
transparency of police behaviour by documenting events, and
as such to serve as a reliable source of evidence of interac-
tions between the police and citizens. Then, by exposing bad
and good behaviour, it is hoped that they will act as deter-
rent against the (mis)use of force and discrimination by police
officers or violent behaviour of citizens against police. In that
sense, several commentators have claimed that the events of
Ferguson would not have happened, had the police used wear-
able cameras.The family of the victim called for police officers
to wear body-worn cameras.5 Finally, because of this deter-
rent effect, body-worn cameras are expected to improve policing
and restore the trust of communities in their police forces.
Yet, the impact of body-worn cameras on the privacy of both
citizens and police officers calls for careful analysis before de-
cision is made for their widespread deployment, particularly
in terms of proportionality. Legal and technical consider-
ations will influence the legitimacy of such use.
We start with an overview of the implementation of police
body-worn cameras in five countries (the US, the UK, Spain,
Belgium and France) and the choices made from technical and
legal viewpoints (Section 2).We then turn to analyse the con-
ditions in which such implementation is acceptable (Section
3). Finally, we review the societal impact such widespread de-
ployment might have, especially the risks of function creep and
contagion to other fields (Section 4).
2. Review of the use of police bodycams in
five countries
The deployment of police body-worn cameras has so far mainly
taken place in the US and in the UK. Other countries are still
testing the technology. In the US, their deployment is driven
by discriminatory behaviours from the police and recurrent
violent encounters between the police and the citizens. In
Europe, while the problem is not that acute in terms of violence,
body-worn cameras are seen as a way to restore trust in po-
licing by promoting peaceful interactions between the police
and citizens in more sensitive situations or neighbourhoods.
Beyond that, in the five countries of study (the US, the UK, Spain,
Belgium and France), their deployment seems to operate in a
grey zone: while their use would most likely fit under the
current legal frameworks, in particular the regulation of video
surveillance, some issues (e.g. recording audio or in private
dwellings) might form substantial obstacles and need to be dealt
with more in detail. This section aims at presenting the dif-
ferent situations factually including contexts,motivations, legal
frameworks and available information about the technical so-
lutions. It does not seek to debate the arguments put forward
for and against the use of body-worn cameras in each of these
countries but rather to provide the raw material for the dis-
cussion developed in the rest of the paper.
2.1. Use of police bodycams in the United States
In the last few years, police body-worn cameras have gained
increased support amongst police officers, the public and the
courts. Research conducted by the US Department of Justice
showed that 63 agencies had equipped their officers with body-
worn cameras.6 US law enforcement agencies are adopting
body-worn cameras for a number of purposes: to improve evi-
dence collection, to strengthen officer performance and
accountability, to enhance agency transparency, to document
encounters between police and the public, and to investigate
and resolve complaints and officer-involved incidents.7 A recent
report from the US Department of Justice mentions the need
to “help police departments ensure events are also captured
from an officers’ perspective” in a “world in which anyone with
a cell phone camera can record video footage of a police
encounter”.8 As a way of example, police body-worn cameras
were adopted in Rialto (California) to reduce the (mis-)use of
force. In NewYork, their deployment was forced by a court de-
cision in order to provide an objective record of “stop-and-
frisks” and assess complaints of racial profiling.9 It was further
argued that the recordings “would mitigate the impression of
individuals that the authorities would be more likely to believe
police officers when the only evidence is oral testimony”.10 The
judge also claimed that the use of police body-worn cameras
would encourage lawful and respectful interactions on the part
of the police and the individual being stopped, by providing
overt recording.
As for the technology used, little information is provided.
Rialto police forces chose TASER Axon cameras coupled with
3 ‘Mark Duggan inquest: Family fury at lawful killing decision’ (BBC
News, 8 January 2014) <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
25657949> [accessed 18 March 2015].
4 Carrie Khan, 2015, op. cit. fn 5. In a similar line of action, the
Bulgarian Interior Minister is planning to equip police cars with
GPS, cameras and audio recording systems to combat corruption.
‘Bulgaria announces new steps to cut corruption at police road-
side checks’ (The Sofia Globe, 25 November 2014) <http://sofiaglobe
.com/2014/11/25/bulgaria-announces-new-steps-to-cut-corruption-
at-police-roadside-checks> [accessed 16 June 2015].
5 Michael B. Marois, ‘Body-Worn Cameras for Police Get Renewed
Focus After Ferguson’ (Bloomberg, 25 November 2014) <http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-25/body-worn-cameras-for-
police-get-renewed-focus-after-ferguson> [accessed 18 March 2015].
6 Ibid.
7 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Implementing a
Body-Worn Camera Program, Recommendations and Lessons Learned
(2014), p. viii.
8 Ibid.
9 Floyd v. City of New York on August 12, 2013, <http://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-
decision.html>.
10 Timothy Banks, ‘Body-worn camera systems: an update’ (The
Privacy Advisor, 11 November 2014) <https://privacyassociation
.org/news/a/body-worn-camera-systems-an-update/> <https://
privacyassociation.org/news/a/body-worn-camera-systems-an-
update/> [accessed 18 March 2015].
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EVIDENCE.COM, a cloud-based storage and management
system, where video files can be stored and easily accessed
for review.11
ACLU was the first organisation to produce a white paper
which provided clear guidelines to ensure a fair balance
between the need to improve police officer’s accountability and
respect for fundamental rights of both citizens and police of-
ficers. These recommendations are discussed at length in
Section 3. In 2014, the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) of the US Department of Justice published an exten-
sive report providing guidance to law enforcement agencies,
based on the first experiences carried out by police depart-
ments. The report reviews in detail the implications in terms
of privacy, community relationships and internal departmen-
tal affairs. It also notes that where the cameras are deployed,
they create specific expectations about their use by police
amongst courts, arbitrators, civilian review boards and citi-
zens. For instance, people come to expect that officers using
body-worn cameras will record video of everything that happens
while they are on duty. This thus bears the risk of undermin-
ing officers’ credibility every time questions arise about an
incident that was not captured on video.12
The report provides detailed recommendations about when
to record, how long the record should be retained, who has
access to the footage, who owns the recorded data and how
to handle internal, external requests for disclosure and secu-
rity measures. One important aspect is to ensure the
transparency of the policies accompanying the deployment of
the devices.Agencies are encouraged to develop their own com-
prehensive written policy to govern body-worn camera usage.
However, it seems that, despite this guidance, police agen-
cies adopting body-worn cameras do not disclose the content
of the policies to citizens upon requests.13
Another difficulty resides in the conditions surrounding the
recordings in private areas. Some states have modified their
law to frame the use of police bodycams. The main points of
struggle are the audio recording of interactions between the
police and the public and recordings within residences (private
areas), as all parties involved in an interaction must grant their
permission to be recorded. In Pennsylvania,14 a new law was
enacted which allows police officers to wear body-worn cameras
to record their interactions with the public during the course
of his/her duties, without prior court approval.Yet, at the time
of the recording, the officer must be in uniform or otherwise
clearly identified as a law enforcement agent, and must inform
the individual that they are being recorded. Police officers are
not permitted to record within residences.
It is however not always necessary tomodify the legal frame-
work. For instance, in California, the Penal Code Section 633
exempts law enforcement officers from having to inform sus-
pects that they are being recorded. Police departments have
used general orders to extend this exemption to body-worn
cameras.15
Finally, it is worth noting that under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, images recorded by police through body-worn
cameras are subject to public access. This means that in prin-
ciple, anyone could freely request and access such images.This
has significant implications not only in terms of privacy but
also in terms of additional workload for police forces to be able
to adequately answer these requests. The press reported that
a blanket request for access to body camera footage required
the police department addressed to review hundreds of hours
of footage in order to blur faces and other sensitive informa-
tion or to mute the audio.16 In order to reduce both the amount
of video stored and the requests for access, ACLU suggested
that only videos related to incidents involving the use of force,
complaints against officers, or possible misconducts should be
stored by police department. Only those videos would be subject
to public disclosure.
2.2. Use of police bodycams in the United Kingdom
The use of body-worn cameras in the UK is quite wide-
spread. According to statistics of the BBC, half of all police
agencies have equipped their officers with these devices.17
Two recent events have further renewed the interest in these
cameras.As mentioned above, the death of Mark Duggan – shot
during a planned operation – sparked violent riots when a by-
passer disclosed images showing that he was unarmed. Later
on, the “Plebgate” scandal renewed the interest in body-worn
cameras. A MP was led to resign after having been accused to
insult a police officer, accusation that was further proven false
by the surveillance camera footage.18
In the UK, improving policing and restoring the public’s trust
by providing an objective account of most controversial con-
frontations have driven the implementation of body-worn
cameras. In that sense, Liberal Democrats unveiled a pro-
posal to force selected groups of police officers to wear
11 TASER International, ‘City of Rialto Case Study, 2013’ <https://
taser-international.cdn.prismic.io/taser-international%2F8115e245-
f575-4583-a971-0d00641245fc_rialto_study.pdf> [accessed 18 March
2015].
12 COPS (n 8) fn 10, p. 28.
13 Jay Stanley, Intervention at the panel on “I spy with my fly when
surveillance goes mobile” at Computers, Privacy & Data Protec-
tion (CPDP), 21 January 2015, Brussels, <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DfxP6mGRN-g> [accessed 18 March 2015].
14 ‘Police may Use Body Cameras to Record Interactions with the
Public’ (Foreman & Caraciolo, P.C.) <http://www.theharrisburglawyers
.com/2014/02/police-may-use-body-cameras-to-record-interactions-
with-the-public/> [accessed 18 March 2015].
15 Eli Wolfe, ‘The unblinking eye-witness: should all police start
wearing body cameras?’ (California Magazine, Just in, 6 January 2014)
<http://alumni.berkeley.edu/california-magazine/just-in/2014-11-24/
unblinking-eyewitness-should-all-police-start-wearing-body> [ac-
cessed 18 March 2015].
16 Bill Lucia, ‘Massive public records requests cause police to hit
pause on body cam programs’ (Cross-cut.com, 10 November 2014),
<http://crosscut.com/2014/11/body-cams-washington-seattle-privacy-
disclosure> [accessed 19 August 2015].
17 Gary Cutlack, ‘Police “body cams” make criminals 90 per cent
more likely to confess’ (Gizmodo, 21 August 2013) <http://www
.gizmodo.co.uk/2013/08/police-body-cams-make-criminals-90-per-
cent-more-likely-to-confess-quickly/> [accessed 18 March 2015].
18 ‘Plebgate’ (Wikipedia) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plebgate> [ac-
cessed 18 March 2015].
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body-worn cameras, namely officers with firearms, members
of territorial support groups and in Section 60 stop and search
areas.19
It is worth noting that the London MET Police is carrying
out a large-scale testing.20 In September 2014, it was an-
nounced that 500 new cameras would be deployed to uniformed
fire officers and to members of the Territorial Support Group.
During the pilot program, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and
Crime (MOPAC) and the College of Policing are in charge of as-
sessing their added value in terms of criminal justice outcomes,
complaints against police, use of force by the police, amount
of time saved in administration tasks and the impact on public
trust through the use of cameras.21
The MET police will test TASER Axon cameras, which can
be attached to sunglasses, a cap, a shirt or head-mounted. As
in Rialto, the cloud-based EVIDENCE.COM platform is used to-
gether with the cameras.When recording, the cameras capture
a wide-angle, full-colour view of what an officer is facing. Spe-
cific guidelines have been issued to guide police officers and
the decision has been made not to have the cameras perma-
nently switched on. The camera will be turned on when an
incident is in progress.Victims (but not suspects) have the right
to request the camera to be switched off. In any case, indi-
viduals are informed if they are filmed.22 The first tests proved
to be positive, providing additional evidence towards solving
crime or validating an officer’s account of events.23
The use of police body-worn cameras falls under several
pieces of UK legislation such as the Data Protection Act (1998),
but also the Protections of Freedoms Act (2012) which in-
stalls a Surveillance Camera Code of Practice24 and covers any
other system for recording or viewing of images for surveil-
lance purposes, including when used by police forces.The code
contains twelve guiding principles which should guide police
forces when exercising any of their functions, including the
decision to deploy body-worn cameras. Compliance of police
behaviour with the principles contained in the Code is re-
viewed by the courts. Police forces need to be able to justify
all operational and procedural decisions, from visual/audio
capture to ultimate disposal.25 A Surveillance Camera Com-
missioner has been created in order to supervise the integrity
of the entire process.
One of the principles of the Code refers to the necessity to
specify the purpose for which the surveillance camera system
will be used and to justify the need to use such cameras. For
example, if the cameras are used for enforcement purposes
and to protect the safety of staff and the public, then the ICO
(the UK Data Protection Commissioner) advises local authori-
ties to provide officers with clear guidance on when to use the
camera and how they should make filmed individuals aware
that it is taking place.26
Body-worn cameras can also be used when both legiti-
mate and necessary to meet an identified pressing need
(proportionality). The ICO called for a strict application of the
proportionality test before any decision is made to use police
body-worn cameras. It recommends that councils reflect about
the use of body-worn cameras or consider whether there was
a pressing need to capture images of people in this way, as
“filming everyday life via such a system would be unjustified
if there was no need”.27
Other principles mandate to take into account the effect
of the cameras on individuals and their privacy, to review regu-
larly whether their use remains justified, or to implement
appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms.The
CCTV code of practice28 gives more specific advice on when a
privacy impact assessment should be carried out.
Other applicable laws are also worth mentioning.The Crimi-
nal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996) introduces statutory
tests for disclosing material to the defence in criminal cases.
These tests entail specific retention obligations for the police,
and an obligation to implement a full audit trail, from the point
of capture of the image throughout the whole management
process.The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) will
apply when body-worn cameras are used covertly. The Police
and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) defines the circumstances
under which a personmay be photographed by a constable else-
where than at a police station. It excludes the use of sound
recording. If anymaterial from body-worn cameras is to be used
to assist with identifying suspects, users must follow the pro-
visions of the Act.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as in the US, the Freedom
of Information Act (2000) allows public disclosure of the images
recorded by police body-worn cameras.This Act grants general
right of access to all types of recorded information held by public
authorities, which include the digital images recorded by body-
worn cameras.The Act also provides for a series of exemptions
based on the harm that would arise or would be likely to arise
from disclosure (for example if disclosure would be likely to
prejudice a criminal investigation) or if the release of the
information would be contrary to the Data Protection Act.29
19 ‘Put body cameras on stop and search police, say Lib Dems: Party
want laws tightened in effort to increase trust in officers’ (Daily Mail
Online, 12 August 2014) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2722482/Put-body-cameras-stop-search-police-say-Lib-
Dems.html> [accessed 18 March 2015].
20 TASER International, ‘London Met Police Extending AXON Body-
Worn Camera Pilot to Front Line Officers’ (Yahoo! Finance, 30
September 2014) <http://finance.yahoo.com/news/london-met-
police-extending-axon-113000689.html> [accessed 18 March 2015].
21 Ibid.
22 ‘Metropolitan Police officers start wearing body cameras’ (BBC
News, 8 May 2014) <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-
27313500> [accessed 18 March 2015].
23 TASER International (n21) op. cit.
24 Home Office, Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, June 2013.
25 College of Policing, Body-Worn Video, 2014.
26 ‘Police, Justice and Borders’ (Information Commissioner’s Office),
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/police-justice/> [accessed 18
March 2015].
27 Ibid.
28 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘In the picture: A data pro-
tection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal
information’, 15 October 2014. <http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/
sector_guides/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/
Detailed_specialist_guides/ICO_CCTVFINAL_2301.pdf> [accessed 18
March 2015].
29 Information Commissioner’s Office, The Guide to Freedom of
Information, version 4.3, October 2014, p. 29 <https://ico.org.uk/
media/for-organisations/documents/1642/guide_to_freedom_of
_information.pdf> [accessed 19 August 2015].
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These exemptions limit in practice the cases where the footage
would be disclosed.
2.3. Use of police bodycams in Spain
The Madrid police force is testing five body-worn cameras.30
The stated purpose of the cameras is to protect police offi-
cers against attacks or insults from citizens and to assess to
what extent the response of police has been proportionate. Re-
cordings will also support the training of police officers. Citizens
will be granted access to the recordings that could be used as
evidence against an excessive use of force. Initially, body-
worn camera will only be allowed in risky operations, which
are however defined broadly as they include patrols in bar areas.
The five cameras will be tested in different cases. Madrid
is using the samemodel as the LondonMET Police (TASERAxon
Body). The cameras used can record up to twelve hours in a
row (including audio), even in low-light conditions. Record-
ing is activated by the police officer, but the camera constantly
records sequences of 30 seconds (deleted after one minute if
the recording is not activated) to register unwarranted attacks.
The camera also incorporates a sensor that will send an alarm
to central services in case the police officer lays on the ground
for more than 40 seconds. It incorporates a GPS. The camera
has an angle of 130 degrees to provide a wide view.
The images are sent to a central station via the Internet.
They are stored for seven days after which they are perma-
nently deleted if not required by a judge or within a criminal
investigation. Recordings are associated with the involved police
officer and are accessible only by a limited number of opera-
tors from the server.
The use of police body-worn cameras falls under the pro-
visions of both the Spanish Data Protection Act and the Act
on Video surveillance. This Act allows the police to use video
surveillance cameras in public places (i.e. any place without
restrictions of access: streets, parks but also malls, bars, etc.),
provided that individuals are previously informed about the
recording. To comply with this requirement, cameras will be
equipped with a yellow label warning that audio and images
are being recorded. Their use in homes or private places is
subject to warrant or the prior authorisation of the owner.
Images can only be stored for a maximum period of onemonth,
but the Madrid police opted for a period of one week.
2.4. Use of police bodycams in Belgium
In Belgium, the death of a citizen who was threatening police
officers with a cold steel weapon led the police to test body-
worn cameras in one city (Mechelen).31 Police trade unions are
however divided about the usefulness of such devices. While
some of them see body-worn cameras as useful for deterrent
purposes, for identification purposes or for documenting events,
others argue that their added value is limited as the record-
ing is partial: they record only the reaction of the police officer
to the event, not the initial violent act of the perpetrator. Others
feel the use of body-worn cameras as a lack of trust in police
officers.32 Despite these objections, police body-worn cameras
were tested in 2013. The camera could be turned on and off
by the police officers, left to their appreciation.
Further deployment of body-worn cameras in Belgium is
however subject to the modification of the Act on video
surveillance,33 which strictly regulates the use of mobile cameras
for purposes of preventing, documenting, detecting crimes, nui-
sances, and ensuring public safety. Police forces are allowed
to usemobile cameras only to ensure public safety in large gath-
erings that take place in public spaces (such as streets) or semi-
public spaces (such as music festivals or soccer stadiums).The
use of mobile cameras should be temporary (i.e. linked to the
performance of a specific task) and decided by the police of-
ficers in charge.Any other use of mobile cameras will fall under
the scope of the Data Protection Act.
The use of police body-worn cameras outside these cases
(e.g. during day-to-day operational missions) would qualify as
unlawful covert surveillance and as such could be punished
by fines or prison sentences. In addition, the resulting evi-
dence would not be deemed admissible as it would have been
obtained by a conscious unlawful act by the chief of police
services.
Additional barriers stem from other pieces of legislation.
The Police Act should be modified to allow the recorded images
to be used by police officers as evidence in cases of com-
plaints of citizens against police behaviour (and not only in a
judicial procedure).34 Modification of the Eavesdropping Act is
also necessary as, in its current wording, the consent of all
parties to a communication is required for the recording of a
private conversation.35
In order to remedy this situation, the Belgian legislator has
put forward a legislative proposal. The modifications in-
tended to allow police officers to use mobile cameras for the
performance of their tasks (to be further specified in a royal
decree), in dangerous situations or when the police officer feels
threatened for the time necessary to the intervention (deci-
sion to be taken by the police officer in open spaces and by
the mayor in “semi-public” places, i.e. any building or closed
space open to the public for the provision of services36). The
government initially wanted to limit their use to cases where
force was allowed.37 This provision was however deleted after
the Belgian Data Protection Authority considered the wording
30 Juan Antonio Pascual, ‘Policía de Madrid llevará cámaras en el
hombro. ‘Es legal?’ (Computer Hoy, 16 July 2014) <http://computerhoy
.com/noticias/imagen-sonido/policia-madrid-llevara-camaras-
hombro-es-legal-15825>.
31 ‘Equiper les policiers d’une caméra? Un projet de loi est en cours’
(RTBF Info, 30 May 2013) <http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail
_equiper-les-policiers-d-une-camera-un-projet-de-loi-est-en-
cours?id=8006721> [accessed 27 May 2015].
32 ‘Homme abattu dans les Marolles: le SLFP pas favorable aux
bodycams’ (RTBF.BE, 26 May 2013) <http://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/
detail_homme-abattu-dans-les-marolles-le-slfp-pas-favorable-aux-
bodycams?id=8003704> [accessed 27 May 2015].
33 Loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de caméras de surveil-
lance, 21 March 2007, MB 31 May 2007.
34 Belgian Privacy Commission, Opinion 42/2013 of 2 October 2013.
35 Ibid.
36 Article 2.2° of the Video Surveillance Act.
37 ‘Equiper les policiers d’une caméra? Un projet de loi est en cours’
(RTBF Info, 30 May 2013) <http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/
detail_equiper-les-policiers-d-une-camera-un-projet-de-loi-est-
en-cours?id=8006721> [accessed 27 May 2015].
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as too vague.The law proposal also foresees to extend the use
of body-worn cameras to other bodies such as civil protec-
tion, firefighters, and customs.The text is still under the scrutiny
of the Parliament.
2.5. Use of police bodycams in France
In France, the introduction of body-worn cameras is justified
by the need to document interactions with the public in re-
sponse to the increased number of videos taken by citizens with
their smartphones. It is expected to provide evidence of po-
lice’s good behaviour38 by establishing the truth (determining
the facts) and by showing that the use of force was legiti-
mate (establishing the context of police action, documenting
behaviour of people in stop-and-frisks).39 Their use ulti-
mately strives to pacify relationships between police officers
and citizens, relying on the deterrent effect of the camera.
After one year of trials, in 2014, the government asked the
company Exavision to deliver 4500 body-worn cameras to police
in the next five years.40 Some units have however decided to
use another brand, GoPro, cameras used for extreme sports,
more reliable and with a wider angle of vision.
Press releases report that after showing some reluctance,
police officers are welcoming body-worn cameras. Priority will
be given to police units located in sensitive areas.The cameras
will be used for the mission of securing public order, during
day-to-day operations such as identity checks.The cameras are
worn with a harness. They offer angles of vision that allow
filming a person in its close surroundings and feature six hours
of storage.The cameras are constantly recording but the footage
is stored only if decided by the police officer.This allows to store
the images of the 30 seconds prior to the moment when the
officer presses the button, thus giving additional information
on the events the camera will keep a record of the previous
30 seconds in order to show tensions that led to justify the
officer to make this decision. The cameras are visible on
uniforms.
The press has reported that for now, in the context of the
testing, six recordings have been passed on to the courts in
cases of assaults to police officers.41 No report was made of
their use in favour of citizens. The images are time-stamped
to avoid manipulation, and sealed.
The use of body-worn cameras by police forces falls under
the legislation applicable to video surveillance.The use of video
surveillance is subject to official authorisation. The authori-
sation should define the modalities of implementation, such
as appointing the person who can consult the recorded images.
The Internal Security Code42 stipulates that the recording
and sharing of images obtained from the public domain can
only be done by competent public authorities in a limited
number of cases.These include the protection of buildings and
public installations and their surroundings, prevention of attacks
against persons and goods in places particularly exposed to
risks of aggression, robbery or drug traffic, prevention of custom
fraud and the prevention of terrorist acts. Body-worn cameras
should also comply with the technical requirements imposed
by the legislation to ensure the admissibility of video record-
ing as legal evidence.43
The Code prohibits filming the interiors of residential build-
ings and their entrances. Recording of private premises should
be authorised by the French Data Protection Authority.
The public should be informed in a clear and permanent
way of the existence of the video surveillance system and of
the authority or person in charge of the monitoring.This is par-
ticularly important to ensure the lawfulness of audio recording
as the Penal Code forbids recordings without the previous
knowledge or consent of all persons taking part in the
communication.
3. The role of body-worn cameras in police
officers’ accountability
As shown in the previous section, police body-worn cameras
are one additional tool at the disposal of law enforcement.They
act as a transparency mechanism, subjecting to scrutiny that
so far was limited to the parties to the interaction. Video sur-
veillance is here targeted to specific events, places and people.
Because it is mobile, it can happen everywhere, anytime. Its
use is thus highly intrusive into the privacy of both citizens,
who see their encounters with police documented, and police
officers, who are being placed under (constant) monitoring
during the performance of their task. It can also have an impact
on other fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of move-
ment as images are time-stamped, thus disclosing the location
of a person at the moment of recording, or on the right to
privacy of the home when recordings happen in private
dwellings.
The monitoring of police behaviour through body-worn
cameras thus raises a number of issues from a fundamental
rights’ perspective.The conditions of their deployment should
be carefully assessed. As such, three main questions arise.
(1) To what extent are the purposes for which they are deployed
(evidence, deterrence of violent behaviour and overall im-
provement of the policing function) legitimate (Section 3.1)?
(2) Are body-worn cameras the best means to achieve these
goals (Section 3.2)? (3) How can their impact on privacy be
limited through technical design (Section 3.3)?
38 ‘Le Mans. Les policiers équipés de caméras portables’ (Le Maine
libre, 6 June 2013) <http://www.lemainelibre.fr/actualite/le-mans-
les-policiers-equipes-de-cameras-portables-06-06-2013-60152> [ac-
cessed 27 May 2015].
39 Flore Galaud, ‘La police de Seine-Saint-Denis s’équipe de mini-
caméras’ (Le Figaro, 3 July 2009) <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2009/07/03/01016-20090703ARTFIG00333-la-police-de-seine-
saint-denis-s-equipe-de-mini-cameras-.php> [accessed 27May 2015].
40 Angélique Négroni, ‘Les minicaméras se généralisent dans la
police’ (Le Figaro, 18 August 2014) <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2014/08/17/01016-20140817ARTFIG00182-les-minicameras-
se-generalisent-dans-la-police.php> [accessed 27 May 2015].
41 Ibid.
42 Code de la Sécurité Intérieure, art. L-251 and following.
43 Ministerial Decree of 3 August 2007, “portant définition
des normes techniques des systèmes de vidéosurveillance”,
NOR: IOCD0762353A <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte
.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000649127>.
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3.1. Improving the transparency of policing through
police-worn cameras: a pressing social need?
The use of police body-worn cameras creates two types of in-
terference into privacy: one into police officers’ right to privacy
not to be monitored during their work hours, as any em-
ployee, and the other into citizens’ right not to be filmed in
public and private spaces.
The first interference, into police officers’ privacy, can be
justified by the need to protect citizens from a disproportion-
ate use of force.The police enjoy extraordinary powers, mainly
the one of exercising force in order to maintain public safety.
Society thus holds a legitimate interest in requiring that the
exercise of this power should be answerable, directly or indi-
rectly. The primary purpose of accountability in that context
is to avoid misuses of power. It is currently articulated amongst
internal mechanisms (hierarchic controls) and democratic
controls (checks and balances, judicial or parliamentarian
reviews).
The second interference, into citizens’ privacy, can be jus-
tified by the higher social need to ensure the accountability
of police forces or themore specific need to protect police forces’
physical integrity.The use of one justification or the other will
however have an impact on the conditions of the implemen-
tation of body-worn cameras.
That being said, the integration of new elements and tools
within the current system of accountability should be moti-
vated by a genuine need to improve this system. As shown in
the previous section, the motivation for equipping police of-
ficers with body-worn cameras relies on two main arguments.
First is the increasing dissatisfaction with the service pro-
vided by the police to their communities, backed up by videos
of citizens showing police misbehaviour. Second is the need
to protect police officers from increasing violent interactions
with the public.When there is evidence that either citizens or
police are exposed to serious threats, the use for body-worn
cameras would rely on sufficient grounds. Such is the US case,
where the violence used by some police officers against citi-
zens, sometimes leading to their death, is regularly reported
by citizens. In Europe, the situation does not seem that serious,
but sensitive social contexts canmotivate the adoption of body-
worn cameras.The seriousness of the situation should anyway
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
3.2. Suitability of body-worn cameras as an
accountability tool
When the need for reinforcing the accountability of police forces
has been demonstrated, the suitability of body-worn cameras
as accountability mechanism should be assessed. As account-
ability mechanism, they could act in two ways: to apportion
responsibility and to encourage learning. Still, their use as a
tool to provide reliable evidence, to reduce violent behaviour
and improve policing calls for careful consideration.
3.2.1. Body-worn cameras as a reliable source of evidence
Body-worn cameras are first meant to be used as a backward-
looking mechanism, to apportion responsibility. Recordings are
used to document encounters between the police and the public
and to capture evidence. Reviews of recordings will help
investigate and resolve complaints which involve officers,
strengthen officers’ accountability and enhance law enforce-
ment agency transparency.
However, the ability to use the recording as source of evi-
dence before courts is predicated upon their authenticity,
reliability and admissibility.44 This will greatly depend on the
technical features of the cameras. Over a dozen of models are
currently available on the market, with heterogeneous feature
sets. A 2012 report by the US Department of Justice synthesises
variations with respect to key capabilities.45
First, the account given by the camera should be authen-
tic. This means that it should be possible to positively tie
evidentiary material to the incident. This is particularly im-
portant in that context as the images are expected to be used
as “objective” truth. Technical considerations include the use
of timestamps and features that affect the capacity of record-
ing to accurately depict the crime scene such as camera
placement, focal width and battery life.
Timestamps make it possible to prove the date and time
of the incident. They are added to recordings by about half of
the body camera models listed in a primer by the National In-
stitute of Justice.46 This kind of metadata adds a temporal
dimension to the recordings which could be tallied with ex-
ternal clues. Similarly, the integration of GPS data makes the
evidence both more useful and more likely to be seen as ad-
missible proof in court.
Camera placement possibilities have a significant impact
since some of them47 replicate the officer’s point of view, while
others48 may record a different scene than the one the officer
actually sees at a given moment. Such discrepancy weakens
the correspondence between the recorded images and the of-
ficer’s perception, and enables a wider margin of interpretation
when examining the images. Some devices do not have a fixed
mounting point and can therefore provide different vantage
44 Fanny Coudert, Monica Gemo, Laurent Beslay, Fivos Andritsos,
Fivos ‘Pervasive Monitoring: Appreciating Surveillance Data as Evi-
dence in Legal Proceeding’, in 4th International Conference on
Imaging for Crime Detection and Prevention (ICDP 2011), 1–6.
45 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Na-
tional Institute of Justice (NIJ). A Primer on Body-Worn Cameras for
Law Enforcement, 2012, <https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-Worn-
Cameras-508.pdf>.
46 Ibid.
47 For instance head-mounted ones, with a clip above the ear (Op.
Cit. fn. 35) or a clip on the helmet or hat (Sénat de Belgique,Annales
n° 4-116. Question orale de M. Philippe Monfils à la ministre de l’Intérieur
sur «les priorités de la police en termes d’équipements», 2010, <http://
www.senate.be/www/?MIval=publications/viewPub&COLL=H
&PUID=67111826&TID=67116502&POS=1&LANG=fr>), or inte-
grated with Google Glass devices (Yesenia Duran, ‘Google Glass Finds
its Way into Law Enforcement’ (Law and Order, 1 April 2014)
<http://www.hendonpub.com/law_and_order/articles/2014/04/google
_glass_finds_its_way_into_law_enforcement> [accessed 28 May 2015]
and Paul Marks, ‘Body-worn cameras put police evidence beyond
doubt’ (New Scientist, 23 October 2013) <https://www.newscientist
.com/article/mg22029404-400-body-worn-cameras-put-police-
evidence-beyond-doubt/> [accessed 28 May 2015]).
48 For instance, e.g. chest-mounted ones or ones clipped on clothes:
‘Le Mans: Les policiers équipés de caméras portables’ (Le Maine Libre,
6 June 2013) <http://www.lemainelibre.fr/actualite/le-mans-les-
policiers-equipes-de-cameras-portables-06-06-2013-60152> [ac-
cessed 27 May 2015].
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points depending on the decision of the officer using it.49 An
additional consequence of camera placement is the stability
of the video output, with head-mounted cameras normally
yielding more stable images. High-end models may feature
stabilisation mechanisms, but this implies higher costs.
The focal width offered by the models also varies, but most
models provide a large angle of view and therefore record rea-
sonably panoramic scenes. This means that irrelevant
information might be recorded. Large angles of view do not en-
courage targeted recording. However, the angle of view of
recording raises again the question of the discrepancies between
the recorded images and what an officer can actually see, if
the angle differs from the human field of vision.
Recommendations for this and other features have been
defined by the Department of Homeland Security.50 In particu-
lar, minimal requirements for battery life are defined.Too short
battery life carries the risk of partial recording producing in-
complete evidence. Video quality criteria such as resolution
and frame rate are also mentioned. Again, such specifica-
tions have an impact on the value of the recorded evidence,
with insufficient detail preventing an accurate representa-
tion of events.
These issues might however be mitigated thanks to an up-
coming technology, image stitching.51 It makes it possible to
combine the recordings of several different cameras to recon-
struct a larger scenery. The presence of more than one police
officer equipped with a body camera could hence provide richer
information than the mere addition of the individual record-
ings through joint recording.
The latitude let to police officers to turn on and off the
camera can also impact the authenticity of the recording. It
may be tempting to recommend switching cameras on only
in case of violence, but concerns have been voiced that the re-
sulting recording will not contain the initial provocation against
the police, and focus only on the police’s violent reaction,
thereby presenting a distorted image.52 In Spain and in France,
the cameras automatically record the previous 30 seconds to
the moment when the police officer decided to start the re-
cording. However, it is not clear yet whether such time span
will be sufficient to provide an accurate account of the events.
Second, the recording should be reliable, i.e. nothing about
how the evidence was collected and subsequently handled may
cast doubts about its authenticity and veracity. Here, the way
video is transferred from the devices to a centralised storage
area is critical. In case officers perform uploads themselves and
checks are not performed with sufficient rigor, censoring may
occur during the chain of custody. Cameras with automated
upload capabilities prevent this issue but provide less control
over data flows. In any case, stored or transmitted data must
be encrypted and digitally signed to ensure confidentiality and
prevent tampering.
Finally, evidence is admissible if it conforms to legal rules
concerning its gathering, conservation, communication and pre-
sentation. This includes both respect for the rules applicable
to digital evidence preservation stemming from criminal law
procedure and respect of rights of privacy of the persons re-
corded.This aspect will be dealt with in Section 3.3 with greater
detail.
3.2.2. Body-worn cameras as deterrent to violent behaviour
Body-worn cameras have the potential to act as powerful de-
terrent mechanism by exposing behaviour that was previously
not scrutinised. Still, the latitude let to police officers to turn
the camera on and off will be a decisive factor in that regard.
The one-year study conducted in Rialto shows that in order
for body-worn cameras to be an efficient tool leading to socially-
desirable behaviour of the officers who wear them (and of
citizens being videotaped), this should be accompanied by a
given level of certainty of being apprehended in case of
misbehaviour (self-awareness mechanism).53 The research
departs from the hypothesis that CCTV cameras are weak
behaviour modifiers, not because they failed as deterrent
mechanism but rather because the risk to be apprehended is
too low. If cameras are expected to influence behaviour and
to serve as indicators that social norms or legal rules must be
followed, then the level of awareness must be high. In that
sense,Welsh and Farrington showed that the impact of CCTV
cameras on crime, thus their ability to influence behaviour, was
dependent on the degree of coverage of the area by the cameras,
whether their use was combined with other interventions and
if it was targeted to specific categories of crime. 54
The author of Rialto’s study purports that mobile cameras
are likely to have a strong deterrent effect. The study showed
what happens when the level of certainty of apprehension for
professional misconduct was absolute. Police officers were
equipped with body-worn cameras that captured all police–
public encounters. The results of the tests conducted in Rialto
are appalling.55 Citizens’ complaints were reduced in 88% and
the use of force by police officer in 60%.
This option might however face strong privacy obstacles,
e.g. when the police officer enters private or sensitive areas
(such as hospitals). It further subjects police officers to constant
monitoring during their work, an extreme measure that can
49 For instance, in the case of the cameras used by the LAPD, the
devices can be easily clipped on to shirt lapels, hats or glasses
(Michael Griffin, ‘Privacy vs. Accountability: LAPD to Equip Offi-
cers with On-Body Cameras’ (JETLaw, 21 January 2014)
<http://www.jetlaw.org/2014/01/21/privacy-vs-accountability-lapd-
to-equip-officers-with-on-body-cameras/> [accessed 28 may 2015].
50 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, System Assessment and
Validation for Emergency Responders Program (DHS SAVER). Wearable
Camera Systems Assessment Report, 2011.
51 Michael Adam, Christoph Jung, Stefan Roth, Guido Brunnett,
‘Real-time Stereo-Image Stitching using GPU-based Belief Propa-
gation’, Vision Modeling and Visualization (VMV), 2009.
52 ‘Homme abattu dans les Marolles: le SLFP pas favorable aux
bodycams’ (RTBF.BE, 26 May 2013) <http://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/
detail_homme-abattu-dans-les-marolles-le-slfp-n-est-pas-favorable-
aux-bodycams?id=8003704>.
53 Tony Farrar, ‘Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially-
Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-
Worn Cameras on Police Use-of Force’, March 2013, <http://
www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Effect-
of-Body-Worn-Cameras-on-Police-Use-of-Force.pdf>.
54 Welsh and Farrington, Effects of Closed Circuit Television Surveil-
lance on Crime, Campbell Systematic Reviews 2008:17, p. 19.
55 Randall Stross, ‘Wearing a Badge, and aVideo Camera’ (The New-
York Times, 6 April 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/
business/wearable-video-cameras-for-police-officers.html> [ac-
cessed 27 May 2015].
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only be justified under specific circumstances of greater risks
for police officers or citizens. A trade-off must be found.
Striking the right balance between the expectation for
cameras to act as self-awareness mechanism and their impact
on privacy or to avoid chilling effects will certainly need further
investigation. Indeed, it remains to be seen to what extent body-
worn cameras can act positively on police behaviour when
police officers have the latitude to decide when to start and
stop the recordings (under predefined guidelines). This for in-
stance led ACLU to recommend that cameras should record
systematically all interactions with the public, allowing offi-
cers to turn the camera off in other cases.56
3.2.3. Body-worn cameras as a tool to improve police officers’
behaviour
Finally, body-worn cameras may allow acting upon the
behaviour displayed by police officers during their encoun-
ters with citizens, thus improving it. Their deployment should
be accompanied by organisational measures ensuring that
police officers receive sufficient and meaningful feedback from
their supervisors after incidents, eventually leading to sanctions.
In that sense, body-worn cameras can also act as forward-
looking mechanism, to encourage learning. Good behaviour is
exemplified and internalised by police officers. Body-worn
cameras could contribute to police officers’ training and teach
them how to behave in difficult encounters with the public.
The US experience showed that body-worn cameras can serve
as a teaching tool when supervisors review footage with of-
ficers and provide constructive feedback. Some law enforcement
agencies used the recordings to highlight officers whose videos
demonstrate exemplary performance by showing their footage
at training programs or by showing the video during an awards
ceremony.57 Yet, it should not be overlooked that the use of
body-worn cameras also implies a change in the working con-
ditions of police officers, as they become subject to potential
greater scrutiny of their performance at work.58
With regard to the ultimate goal of body-worn cameras –
improving policing – the first results seem positive. The few
studies performed by US police forces during trial tests seem
to indicate that body-worn cameras have a positive impact on
the relations between police and civilians. However, body-
worn cameras should not be approached as the magic bullet.
Technology is nomore than ameans to achieve a goal. It cannot,
by itself, build better relations between police and the general
public, improve policing or solve inherent community prob-
lems. Body-worn cameras have as unique feature the potential
to provide transparent records of events.
The question of the suitability of the use of police body-
worn cameras leads to a broader reflection on the circumstances
under which the use of mobile cameras will bring added value
to the function of policing and to the relations between police
and the public. As a way of example, one commentator noted
the importance of adequately understanding and addressing
the social problems associated with, for instance, stop and
search.59 Body-worn cameras should only be approached as one
tool, part of larger efforts to improve policing practice. As for
any technology, their introduction should be guided and prop-
erly framed in order to ensure wide and effective use.
Systematic evaluations are required to learn about the context
or the type of crime they can effectively address, and to adjust
their use accordingly.60 In words of Custers and Begouw “using
technology in policing is too complex to simply buy technological
product off-the-shelf and start using them”. Another illustration
of the need to further study the impact of the use of body-
worn cameras concerns the effectiveness of the police services
themselves. Indeed, it may be the case that, knowing that all
their actions are recorded, police officers will tend to take as
few risks as possible and interact less with citizens.This might
cause a decrease in the quality of their work and thus of the
level of protection enjoyed by citizens. The chilling effect that
video surveillance has on observed individuals has been dem-
onstrated elsewhere.61 Thus, as relatively untested technology,
both the perceived benefits and concerns of police body-
worn cameras still need to be further researched and
demonstrated.62
3.3. Limiting the impact on fundamental rights:
conditions of use and privacy by design (proportionality
stricto sensu)
The final aspect to be assessed is to what extent the impact
of body-worn cameras on privacy can be limited by
organisational and technical measures.We focus on four con-
cerns: (1) the duty to inform filmed persons, (2) the time and
content of the recordings, (3) the access to and storage of the
recordings, and (4) additional risks from upcoming technologies.
3.3.1. Duty to inform and consent
One key principle applying to any personal data processing ac-
tivity is to ensure its transparency. Under the data protection
framework, when consent to be filmed is not required, the
persons being filmed should at least receive adequate infor-
mation about the fact that they are being filmed, the purpose
of the recording and the person responsible for it.
It follows that the cameras should be made visible to the
person being recorded. The recording of the time and the
56 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Police Body-Mounted
Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win For All, 201, 2013, <https://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras.pdf>
[accessed 27 May 2015].
57 US Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Ser-
vices (COPS), Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program,
Recommendations and Lessons Learned 2014:26–27.
58 Michael D.White, Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: Assessing the
Evidence, Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, 2014.
59 Daniel Bear and Johannes Rieken, ‘Those cheering for police
body-worn cameras must think a little deeper’ (The Guardian, 15
August 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
aug/15/police-body-worn-cameras-liberal-democrats-proposals-
policies> [accessed 27 May 2015].
60 Bart Custers, BasVergouw, ‘Promising policing technologies: Ex-
periences, obstacles and police needs regarding law enforcement
technologies’, Computer Law & Security Review 2015;31:518–526.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2015.05.005>.
61 See e.g. Giovani Butarelli, Report to the Council of Europe on “Pro-
tection of personal data with regard to surveillance and guiding principles
for the protection of individuals with regard to the collection and pro-
cessing of data by means of video surveillance”, 2000.
62 Michael D. White, 2014, op. cit fn 54.
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place of the data collection should also be made explicit.
The fact that body-worn cameras are mobile makes it more
difficult to meet these requirements. The monitoring is not
focused on one predefined area and can be subject to the
police officer’s latitude. In addition, body-worn cameras are
equipped with audio recording capabilities so as to give an
account of the oral exchanges taking place. Spain has opted
for featuring the cameras with yellow information labels. In
France, police officers must, in addition, mention the record-
ing orally.
Still, in some cases, a general duty to inform will not be suf-
ficient and consent must be gathered before the recording takes
place. This is particularly the case when police officers decide
to film private dwellings, sensitive areas (such as hospitals),
specific events or involve the collection of sensitive data (e.g.
when the recording focuses on a crime victim).
3.3.2. Time and content of the recording
Constant recording does not seem an acceptable interfer-
ence into the right to privacy of policemen and of the persons
filmed. Question arise about how to set the limits of the re-
cording so it is both efficient, i.e. likely to reach its goal, and
not excessive.
The first consideration will be on the categories of indi-
viduals who could film and be filmed. Restrictions may apply
on the officers wearing the cameras: for example, in some case
their use was limited to armed officers.63 Restrictions may apply
to the individuals being recorded, for example to suspects only.
In some cases, only individuals about to get arrested or to get
tickets could be filmed.64 Scenes involving victims raise addi-
tional questions: may victims be filmed at all? What of
situations where both a suspect and a victim appear in the
same scene? Considering that the protection of the victims
should be the prime concern of police forces, does their in-
creased vulnerability imply even greater privacy risks from
filming?
Some technologies can helpmodulating who is being filmed.
Automatic blurring or pixellation could obfuscate faces.65 Those
masking techniques require the identification of critical image
elements (i.e. subject faces) as a first step, using object detec-
tion techniques. Those elements can then be removed or
obfuscated. However, a drawback of this approach is that
obfuscation is irreversible, i.e. it is not possible to recover the
original images from the obfuscated version.66
The second consideration will bear on the circumstances
of the recording. Should the recording be limited to specific
events (public demonstrations, stop and searches, violent en-
counters) or should the police be allowed to use them during
routine patrols? Should the recording be triggered automati-
cally in certain cases, for instance when car sirens are turned
on? Some contexts seem especially sensitive and may entail
specific procedures. Some police departments systematically
deactivate recording in hospitals.67 In the case of private homes,
recording may be either completely forbidden, or require
consent by inhabitants.68 For example, the Cheverly (Mary-
land, US) police department switches off recording in “private
contexts,”69 although this notion is not explicitly defined and
therefore includes a margin of appreciation by officers. In par-
ticular, it is not clear whether this applies to interactions
between officers or to other situations as well.
Finally, the degree of freedom allowed to police officers for
triggering recording must be defined clearly. Can body-worn
cameras be turned off at all, or can only recording be switched
on and off while the device is always functioning? In the latter
case,70 cameras cannot be turned off but are not constantly
recording.
The question of when recording can be stopped by police
officers is critical. ACLU argues that the recording must always
be activated to prevent officers from editing on the fly to censor
behaviour they do not want recorded.71 In Belgium,72 officers
have full freedom to activate and deactivate recording. In some
cases, procedures are defined: in the case of Laurel in the US,
recording can be switched off but must be switched on every
time an officer leaves a car to interact with individuals.73 As-
suming officers are allowed at all to switch off recording, should
they be able to do so during a single interaction with indi-
viduals? The risk of omitting embarrassing behaviour seems
especially strong with this provision. For this reason, ACLU
states that cameras should record “all interactions with the
public”.74 However, in some cases such as in Seine-Saint-
Denis (France),75 officers have full freedom to switch off
recording at discretion.
63 Martin Naylor, ‘Derbyshire police investigate “usefulness” of body
cameras in wake of Mark Duggan inquest’ (Derby Telegraph, 13
January 2014) <http://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/Derbyshire-police-
investigate-usefulness-body/story-20434996-detail/story.html> [ac-
cessed 27 May 2015]; ‘Le Mans: Les policiers équipés de caméras
portables’ (Le Maine Libre, 6 June 2013) <http://www.lemainelibre
.fr/actualite/le-mans-les-policiers-equipes-de-cameras-portables-
06-06-2013-60152> [accessed 27 May 2015].
64 “When people get tickets or get arrested they’re going to be
taped” (JETLaw, 2014). See also in UK, the Police and Criminal Evi-
dence Act (1984) defines the conditions under which a person may
be photographed by a constable elsewhere than at a police station.
65 Srinivas Gutta,MiroslavTrajkovic,Antonio J. Colmenarez,Vasanth
Philomin. ‘Method and Apparatus for Automatic Face Blurring’.
Patent US 6959099 B2, 2005.
66 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Privacy and
Video Surveillance in Mass Transit Systems: A Special Investigation Report.
Privacy Investigation Report MC07-68, 2008, <https://www.ipc.on.ca/
images/Findings/mc07-68-ttc_592396093750.pdf>.
67 Rachel Weiner, ‘Police body cameras spur privacy debate’ (The
Washington Post, 10 November 2013) <http://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/crime/police-body-cameras-spur-privacy-debate/2013/
11/10/7e9ee504-2549-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html>.
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d’équipements», 2010 <http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval
=publications/viewPub&COLL=H&PUID=67111826&TID=67116502
&POS=1&LANG=fr>.
73 Rachel Weiner, 2013. Op.cit. fn 6358.
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Risks resulting from on-the-fly editing, in cases where of-
ficers are not subject to strict procedures with regards to
recording, could be mitigated by tracking how often officers
switch recording on and off and flagging those who do it ex-
ceptionally often. In this case, the privacy of officers is directly
in tension with abuse mitigation.
3.3.3. Access to and storage of recordings
Assuming videos have been recorded, several questions remain
open as to the circumstances under which they are stored, and
who can access them and under which constraints.
Recordings can be either managed internally, or using the
services of an external contractor. In both cases, procedures
relative to video access, transmission and deletion must be
defined, as well as the identities and roles of data controllers
and processors. Since recordings will be centralised, privacy
threats are especially significant during their storage: during
this stage of the data life cycle, a large quantity of personal
data is concentrated in a single spot.Video management con-
ditions ought to be clarified accordingly.
A factor increasing privacy protection with regard to video
management is the presence of accountability measures for
access, generating histories of access, e.g. including the iden-
tity of the individual accessing the data, a timestamp and the
purpose of access. This is of significant importance to avoid
function creep, i.e. that footage is used for other purposes than
the ones which motivated the initial recording. Another useful
technology is on-the-fly (?) encryption of recordings, which in-
creases confidentiality.
Even if access rights are defined, they must be technically
enforced, andACLU recommends ensuring the security of back-
office video data storage.76 The local or distributed nature of
storage carries additional consequences. Some departments
adopt cloud storage;77 it is not clear to which extent the cloud
provider guarantees specific security measures (and the lack
of such measures would represent a major source of risk).
Backup procedures must be implemented, since the videos con-
stitute evidence to be protected.
Indeed, one purpose or consequence of the recordings of
body-worn cameras is to provide evidence. Should the videos
only be reviewed in case of declared incidents or should su-
pervisors display a more proactive behaviour by conducting
randomised reviews? The latter increases pressure on offi-
cers by opening the door to sanctions even in the absence of
misconduct allegations by the public.
The data retention period of the recordings should also be
defined strictly. While a department in the US applies a re-
tention limit as long as six months given the data are not tagged
as evidence,78 there have been calls for a much shorter time,
e.g. 30 days.79 Spain has opted for a stricter data retention
period. Recording are deleted after a period of seven days if
the recording is not required as evidence in a criminal inves-
tigation. In addition to this maximal retention time, another
criterion is the conditions under which earlier deletion can
occur, including the identities of agents who can perform de-
letions and the circumstances under which they can do so.
With regard to the right of access to the recordings, access
by police officers, the individuals filmed and third parties will
call for different rules. For example, one may wonder under
what conditions police officers should be allowed to review their
own recordings (and thus exercise their access right). In some
cases, videos are centrally stored so officers can watch the
videos originating from their own camera on their smartphones,
but cannot edit nor delete them.80 A number of technologies
relate to the security of existing videos rather than to the way
the recording is done. Fine-grained access control to devices
could restrict playback to the officer to whom the device was
assigned, in cases where playback is at all available on the body
camera. In one use case in the US, officers can only see their
own footage, not the ones from their peers, but a supervisor
has access to all videos.81
In addition to access by police officers, the conditions to
grant access to individuals appearing in recordings must be
clearly defined. From a data protection point of view, citizens
have a right to access the recording in which they appear, which
should be balanced against the right to privacy of other persons
appearing on the footage.This balance is usually made by blur-
ring the faces of the other persons involved. Other issues stem
from the fact that the recordings are meant to be produced as
evidence in criminal proceedings.The question here is whether
the access by data subjects should be limited to their repre-
sentatives (lawyers) or if they should be granted a direct access
to the footage. For instance ACLU supports an effective appli-
cation of the right of access, which should not be restricted
to lawyers in the context of a criminal procedure.82 Finally, the
requests of third parties requesting access under the Freedom
of Information Act, wherever such possibility is regulated by
the legal framework, will call for a balancing between the right
to information and the right to privacy of the persons appear-
ing on the footage.
3.3.4. Risks posed by upcoming technologies
A number of video camera technologies, existing or currently
under development, have a significant impact on privacy and
should therefore be taken into account when assessing the
impact of wearable body-worn cameras. A recent European
project (SurPRISE) highlightedmany such features.83 Some tech-
nologies make it possible to isolate the position or movement
of recorded entities. Faces may be matched against data-
bases or recognised. The advent of behavioural pattern
recognition techniques raises the question of whether (or when)
these techniques could be used to identify individuals even
when their faces are not recorded in detail. Even more intrusive
76 Ibid.
77 Rachel Weiner, 2013. Op.cit. fn 6358.
78 Ibid.
79 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Op. Cit. fn. 5651.
80 Rachel Weiner, 2013. Op.cit. fn 6358.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 SurPRISE. D 3.1 – Report on surveillance technology and privacy en-
hancing design, 2013 <http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/SurPRISE-D3.1-Report-on-surveillance-technology-
and-privacy-enhancing-design.pdf>.
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mechanisms such as automated emotion recognition and clas-
sification are under development.84
The capture of additional metadata, for instance geographi-
cal location through GPS, enriches the resulting recording and
can be seen as an additional privacy threat. Thermal imaging
has also been proposed in the context of surveillance, and can
be used to track individuals in low lighting conditions.85Thermal
facial pattern recognition has been proposed in the context of
biometric identification,86 but one could envision its use inmore
adversarial contexts involving police officers and suspects. If
these techniques become commonly available in commercial
body-worn cameras, the systematic tracking and automatic
identification of individuals appearing in recordings of police–
public interactions cannot be discarded.
Body-worn cameras are normally assumed to record images
statically, but remote control from a command centre could
be combined with pan–tilt–zoom capabilities to selectively
record operator-chosen areas picked from a scene. Face rec-
ognition might also be combined with pan–tilt–zoom to achieve
similar effects without the need for remote control. In both
cases, the produced video is less neutral and the link to the
officer’s field of vision is less straightforward, complicating any
discussion involving the question of what visual information
exactly was available to the involved officer.
4. Recommendations: body-worn cameras for
the police and beyond
In the previous sections, we have presented an assessment of
the current situation in the usage of police body-worn cameras
for law enforcement from the experimental, technical and legal
points of view. As discussed in Section 2, different countries
are at varying stages of level of adoption of this technology but
it is spreading across the world, to the point that we may
imagine that most countries will adopt it sooner or later (even
if adoption may occur at different scales and in different con-
ditions). Indeed, motivations for the adoption of police body-
worn cameras are similar in all countries:
1. For civil society, the need to make police more accountable.
2. For police officers, the need to protect themselves against
false accusations.
3. For policy-makers and society, the expected pacifying effect
on the interactions between police and citizens.
In addition, even if some criticisms have been voiced, the
predominant view of the stakeholders seems to be that in most
of the contexts in which they have been used so far the benefit–
risk ratio of police body-cameras is quite positive. Some
experimental results, such as the 88% reduction in citizen com-
plaints and 60% reduction in uses of force in Rialto, are quite
impressive – even though they need to be confirmed at a larger
scale.
The situation is not that clear on the legal side however,
and most countries are still trying to figure out how to adapt
their legislation to frame the use of bodycams by the police.
In this section, we present our analysis of the benefits and risks
of the deployment of police body-worn cameras and distin-
guish between short-term recommendations and a longer term
reflection about the potential generalisation of the approach.
4.1. Benefits of a cautious deployment of police body-
worn cameras
A possible line of reasoning in this matter is a comparative
analysis with traditional video-surveillance cameras, which is
the closest existing technology.Technically speaking, the main
differences between the two instruments are the following:
1. Body-worn cameras are not necessarily (even not usually)
switched on permanently: they may be under the control
(partial or total) of the police officers wearing them. Offi-
cers may be able to decide to turn them on or off, or even
to delete footage.
2. Body-worn cameras can simultaneously record audio and
video and capture close-up images that allow for the use
of facial recognition technology.
3. Body-worn cameras are mobile and can potentially be used
everywhere, including in places which are out of reach of
traditional video-surveillance cameras, such as homes or
hospitals.
If appropriate measures are taken, we believe that all these
features can be turned into advantages of bodycams (with
respect to privacy protection) in comparison with fixed video-
surveillance cameras. Because they are mobile and possibly
turned on by police forces, body-worn cameras do not record
individuals indifferently and permanently: they can rather be
used in specific places and at specific times where and when
a significant event occurs. In addition, if police officers wear
a clear sign (or ask people for their consent, which might not
be easy in practice), the risk of being filmed without noticing
it (which has become the norm in most modern cities) is much
lower. If misused, their ability to record sounds as well as images
can not only obviously become an additional intrusion capac-
ity but they can also improve the quality and the richness of
the recording and therefore reduce the risk of misinterpretation.
However, it is necessary to ensure that these benefits are
not outweighed by new privacy threats. Appropriate guaran-
tees can be provided by a combination of technical,
organisational and legal measures. For example, it is of prime
importance that:
1. Police officers have clear instructions regarding camera op-
eration (for example to ensure that any encounter with the
public would be covered, except in situations where the
consent of the people involved is required and not granted,
84 Yisu Zhao, XinWang,Miriam Goubran,ThomasWhalen and Emil
M. Petriu, ‘Human emotion and cognition recognition from body
language of the head using soft computing techniques’, Journal of
Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, Springer, 2013.
85 Wai KitWong, Poi NgeeTan, Chu Kiong Loo andWay Soong Lim.
‘An Effective Surveillance System Using Thermal Camera’, Inter-
national Conference on Signal Acquisition and Processing (ICSAP), 2009.
86 Siu-Yeung Cho, ChanWai Ting and Chai Quek, ‘Thermal Facial
Pattern Recognition for Personal Verification Using Fuzzy CMAC
Model’, International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and
Control, 2011.
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with appropriate evidence of such refusal87) and incur sanc-
tions in case of breach of these instructions. For these
sanctions to be really deterrent, they must be severe enough
and associated with actual checks of the records. In addi-
tion, if a police officer is accused of misconduct for any event
which is not recorded and for which (s)he cannot justify the
lack of record, this should “create an evidentiary presump-
tion against the officer” (ACLU 2013) and be considered an
aggravating factor.
2. Cameras record a sufficient period of time88 preceding the
button-pressing by the police officer to ensure that any rel-
evant event preceding the triggering is recorded. Indeed,
experience shows that such events can be useful to fully
understand the context.
3. Police officers wear clear sign showing that they use
cameras, and obtain the consent of the people involved in
certain situations such as in private dwellings. They must
also keep track of such consent or refusal.
4. Police officers cannot delete, edit or otherwise modify any
record.
5. The records are audited by dedicated police supervisors on
a regular basis to ensure the deterrence effect: as dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, knowing that their actions are recorded
may have little effect on police officers if they also know
that the records are deleted without ever being watched.
6. The records are stored in a secure way for a well-defined
period89 and then automatically (and securely) deleted. In
addition, it is essential that precise access control rules are
defined and implemented and all accesses to the records
are auditable. Only accredited policy officers, justice offi-
cers and individuals appearing in recordings should be
allowed to see footage, and only in specific conditions. The
records should never be released publicly without the
consent of the persons involved.
7. No face recognition feature is integrated in the system during
or after the collection of data, since it is not necessary for
the purpose and could divert the system from its official
objective. Function creep should be avoided by all means
since it would ruin the very purpose of such systems: to
enhance trust.
These conditions are in line with the recommendations of
ACLU (ACLU 2013), which include additional suggestions about
flagging videos and securing the back-end system.They are not
meant to be exhaustive, but we believe that they already provide
sufficient safeguards to ensure that the benefits of police
bodycams in terms of accountability (and deterrence against
police abuse) outweigh the risks in terms of privacy.
To conclude this section, one caveat must be added however.
The use of police bodycams should not lead to complacency
or over-reliance on technology. Police bodycams are sometimes
presented as the ultimate solution to ascertain a sequence of
events in case of disagreement about the behaviour of police
forces. As discussed in Section 3, even if police bodycams can
of course contribute a lot to establish the truth (and they are
used precisely for this reason), one must keep in mind that they
can only provide pictures taken from a particular position, with
a specific coverage angle and within a limited period of time.
In addition, the quality of the pictures and the sound them-
selves may not be perfect. As a consequence, one should not
rely on police bodycams to be the absolute and unique source
of evidence for any event involving police forces, even though
they can greatly contribute to establish the truth.
4.2. Beyond police: where to draw the line?
Beyond their use by police forces, bodycams raise challeng-
ing questions in terms of accountability, privacy and even –
at a political level – about the type of society in which we would
like to live in. Indeed, if we conclude as we did in the previ-
ous subsection, with a favourable (even if cautious) position
about the use of bodycams by the police, the next question
could be the following. If their use by the police is legitimate,
or even desirable, what about other professions such as prison
officers, custom officers, bailiffs, transport ticket controllers and
so on? Indeed, all these professionals may also be caught up
in situations of conflict with the public that might escalate into
violence. Different positions could then be taken, depending
on the acceptable grounds put forward for the use of the
bodycams.The discussion in Section 3 shows that three main
purposes are put forward for their use:
1. The need for more accountable police forces, and to protect
citizens from police abuse.
2. The need for police officers to protect themselves from false
and malevolent accusations.
3. The need for society to ensure peaceful relations between
police and citizens and to minimise public unrest.
Considering the first and third purposes only would lead
to accept or even to recommend the use of bodycams by any
professional with the power of inflicting harm to people. This
would obviously include any professional carrying weapons.
But what about professions which could involve risks to the
public, even risks of death, such as bus drivers or surgeons?
The main difference in this case is that harms would be un-
intentional, but it could still result from professional misconduct
or negligence. If the objective is to protect citizens and enhance
the accountability of professionals who are in a position to harm
them, why not consider also bodycams in such activities?
The second objective would lead to even larger accep-
tance of bodycams. Indeed, professionals who can be subject
of malevolent accusations are numerous.The first example con-
cerns teachers, professors, nurses and all activities in contact
with children in which false accusations of child abuse have
been reported. One could also consider civil servants in public
administration services, or potentially any professional in
contact with the public who can be wrongly accused by
dissatisfied customers. Obviously, the potential damage suf-
fered by professionals can vary a lot (from criminal sanctions
to disciplinary sanctions and emotional distress), but the
87 Another option would be to require to turn turning the camera
on only for specific missions such as security order.
88 The precise amount of time is to be assessed by field experts.
This requirement means that cameras are in fact permanently re-
cording but deleting their records after this oneminute period unless
the police officer has pressed on the button.
89 As suggested by ACLU (Op. Cit. fn. 5651.), “retention periods
should be measured in weeks, not years”.
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question is again: where to draw the line? On which basis can
we decide that the risk of false accusation for a professional
is high enough to justify the use of bodycams (or simple
cameras when their work is sedentary) to protect them, or in-
sufficient to put the privacy of the public at risk?
In fact, the slope is even more slippery with the self-
protection justification because it could be potentially valid for
any person, in any activity involving an interaction with another
individual. Indeed, if teachers are allowed (on a voluntary basis)
to wear bodycams to protect themselves, why should their
pupils not be able to do so? If a person is filmed by a civil
servant in a city hall or by a salesman in a shop, why should
not he be allowed to film them?Actually, as discussed in Section
3, this is precisely the argument used by some police officers
to claim the use of bodycams. Following this argument, anyone
could be entitled to wear cameras because anyone could one
day be the victim of false accusations and would like to be in
a position to prove his good faith. This argument is not as fu-
turist as it may seem since it is already used by one million
Russian drivers using dashboard cameras to be able to defend
themselves against fraudulent insurance claims in case of
accidents.90
The next step in this line of thoughts is the “lifelogging”
attitude. Again, some technophiles have already taken this
path. For example, Gordon Bell wrote in Total Recall:91 “Imagine
how it could affect therapy sessions, friendly wagers, court
testimony, lovers’ spats (. . .). Imagine how easy it will be to
prove that repairs were done, that a salesman went back on
his word, or that the dog really did eat your homework.
Think of how nice it would be to have recordings of child-
hood conversations with your best friend, or a complete audio
library of the millions of priceless things your kids said.” For
the last years, Bell has recorded all what he said, what he
has seen, his movements, so basically all his activities. He
also wears a camera taking pictures of what he sees every
thirty seconds.
Needless to say, the generalised use of bodycams, which
naturally leads to the idea of life-logging, would have a tre-
mendous impact on social life for various reasons. Actually,
one could say that the two objectives sought with police
bodycams would be magnified to the extent that their conse-
quences are incalculable:
1. Everyone92 would become accountable and should be able
to produce evidence in case of accusation.This means that
people reluctant to the use of bodycams would actually have
to use them or to risk of suffering evidentiary presump-
tion against them in case of accusation.
2. Behaviour of individuals itself would transform because of
the observer effect, and even more markedly if they know
that the records could possibly be shown as evidence.
The result of this trend would be what has been called a
sousveillance society,93 or the surveillance of everyone by ev-
eryone, with obvious risks of paternalism, conformism and
uniformity of behaviour.
Obviously, the adoption of police bodycams does not in-
evitably lead to this extreme scenario; but there are sufficient
preliminary signs that this path could actually be followed by
our technophile societies. The development of Google Glass,
even though its primary objective is not surveillance, could be
another small step in this direction by accustoming people to
see cameras everywhere. Therefore, we believe that the de-
ployment of police bodycams should be accompanied by a
continuous assessment of its consequences (with respect to
all the objectives discussed above) and a longer-term reflec-
tion about the generalisation of body-worn cameras and their
impact on society.
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